
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is the problem with Direct Record Electronic (DRE) (computer touch screens)?
- Currently, most Virginians vote on DRE machines that do not
provide a paper record or other independent means of verifying that the
machine is accurately recording the voter's intentions. Without this
paper record, machines cannot be audited for accuracy after an election,
and there can be no meaningful recount in the event of a close or
disputed election. DREs provide no means to detect or remedy programming
errors or fraudulent software that evades pre-election testing.
- What are the possible solutions?
- The only solution is for all voting machines to provide a
voter-verified audit trail, independent of the software in the machine,
and for election officials to routinely use the audit trail to check for
errors. We can either attach printers to the side of DREs, which has
real problems with paper jams, complexity, long lines and human factors,
or convert to simple reliable proven optical scan.
- Do Americans want elections that have a paper trial for audits and recounts?
- Voting machines are one of the few areas recently in which a truly
grass-roots reform movement, made up largely of ordinary Americans, has
not only made a huge difference — it is also well on its way to
winning. Today, a majority of states (28) — including Florida,
California, New York, Illinois and Ohio — require electronic
voting machines to produce a voter-verified paper trail. There is
paper-trail legislation pending in a dozen more states. Virginia has
laws SB 840S and HB 2707S pending.
- What are audits?
- Audits check the machine accuracy. Audits are not recounts. Audits
take place during the normal canvas process, and involve checking
a small number of machines to guard against software error or other problems.
- What is happening to this legislation?
- SB 840S passed the Senate 36-4 with a ban on future DRE purchases
and wireless, strong audit and recount provisions, and is currently
before the House S & T Committee. HB 2707S passed the House 81-18.
Although it kept the DRE and wireless ban, the important audit
provisions were removed. It is now before the Senate P & E committee.
- What is the point of an audit trail, if it can't be used in audits or
recounts, as in HB 2707S?
- Providing a paper trail is important, but it only serves its purpose
if it can legally be examined during audits and recounts. The bill
that passed the Senate is stronger in this regard.
- What is fact and what is fiction about US HR 811 (the 2007 Holt bill)?
- Outdated information has been distributed saying that if Virginia
requires audits before the 2007 Holt Bill passes, Virginia would only
get half of the federal grant. That is absolutely NOT true.
The federal allotment formula is based on what was in place in
November 2006, so Virginia jurisdictions would get assistance to
purchase verifiable voting machines. There are also provisions for the
federal government to cover costs of conducting audits of federal elections.
- Why are the registrars the only ones opposing this bill when many voting
experts agree that optical scan systems are the best technology to have
verified voting?
- In 2002, Congress gave states money to upgrade their voting systems,
but it did not impose a voter-verified audit trail requirement. Optical
scan voting is far superior to adding printers to DREs for producing
an audit trail. The Registrars are defending their decision to buy the
DREs, even if it means continuing to base our elections on
unverifiable equipment
- Will using optical scan tabulators make lines longer?
- Jurisdictions using optical scan have reported that lines are
greatly diminished. With optical scan, many voters can fill out
their ballots simultaneously. The ballots are then quickly read by a tabulator.
- Will blind and disabled voters be disenfranchised by optical scan voting?
- Not at all. Federal law requires each precinct to provide a means for
blind and disabled voters to cast a private secure ballot. Some Virginia
jurisdictions satisfy that requirement with a DRE, but others provide a
device that a blind or disabled voter can use to mark a paper ballot.
Hanover and Chesterfield counties currently use the well-regarded
Automark machine for this purpose. Other counties could do the same.